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THE ISIS PROJECT: Quarterly R &
D Status Report

February 4, 1986 - May 4, 1986

Kenneth P. Birman

TECHNICAL REPORT

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Department of Computer Science
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York

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THE ISIS PROJECT: Quarterly R&D Status Report

Feb. 4, 1986 - May 4, 1986

Kenneth P. Birman

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1. Description of Progress

This report summarizes accomplishments of the *ISIS* project during the period Feb 4, 1986 - May 4, 1986. We assume that the reader is familiar with the goals of the project and has read some of our recent progress reports. Accordingly, the summary will be brief and targeted to specific accomplishments made during this period, rather than the overall status of the project.

↓
The first quarter of 1986 represents the beginning of our second year of DARPA funding, and we are pleased to report substantial progress in several important areas. Our effort is now focusing on making the technology of fault-tolerance easier to use, and stripping as much unessential overhead from our approach as we can. ^{single quotes} We believe that by adopting what is essentially a "RISC" approach to software fault-tolerance, it will be possible to address a broader collection of distributed computing problems than we have in the past, making our work useful to practitioners whose applications cannot be addressed efficiently using our current approach (resilient objects). Our plan is to develop a new system that will continue to provide resilient objects at a high level, but will also include support for fault-tolerant process groups (described below) at a lower level. This lower level will be directly accessible to programmers, and much of our own software will reside within it, including a collection of fault-tolerant services embodying specialized distributed algorithms, such as ^(A) the shared memory mechanism (described below). → Also included is a paper not filed!

In the subsections that follow, we first summarize activity on the *ISIS* prototype, then discuss the new system, and then describe some of the other activities of the project.

1.1. *ISIS* Prototype and Application Software

Since completing the *ISIS* prototype, we have been using it to develop application software. This presently includes a calendar program, described in our previous quarterly status report, and a distributed monitoring program that uses *ISIS* to distribute a task over multiple sites and then to monitor the computation while it is underway, reacting dynamically to failures and other events. It is interesting to note that both of these programs were developed largely by naive programmers with no understanding of fault-tolerance or distributed protocols. In addition to demonstrating

how *ISIS* can be used, these applications have helped us debug it. Because the prototype now seems quite stable, a copy has been made available to colleagues at Berkeley, where Prof. Domenico Ferrari's group is considering using it for experimental purposes. We will continue to make this version of *ISIS* available to other researchers on a limited basis.

A new paper on *ISIS* was completed during the report period [1]. In addition to giving a detailed analysis of the algorithms used in the system, this paper describes the calendar program and the techniques used to develop it, and presents new performance data. One unexpected insight resulted from this performance work. We discovered that using our *concurrent update* techniques [2] [3], updates of replicated data can actually be cheaper than updates to non-replicated data. This is counterintuitive: one would have expected that a computer system must do more work to maintain multiple copies of a data item than to maintain just a single copy, and hence performance should degrade as the number of copies increases. In fact, *ISIS* operates more efficiently under moderate distributed loads, for two reasons. First, our approach divides updates to replicated objects into local and remote computational activity, and the remote part is much cheaper than the remote part. Thus, when the local work for a collection of operations is distributed over multiple sites, a given site ends up doing less work than if it had to do everything by itself. Moreover, a significant amount of "piggybacking" occurs when the system operates this way (that is, a typical communications packet carries multiple messages, not just one message). Since I/O overhead is a significant cost factor in *ISIS*, this means that it becomes less expensive to read a typical message, hence efficiency rises until the maximum level of piggybacking is reached. The net impact of these two effects is that performance improves when objects are replicated to small numbers of sites, for moderate request loads presented randomly at all sites. Specifically, we observed improved performance for objects distributed to as many as six sites and subjected to request loads of up to 10 operations per second -- very respectable for SUN 2 workstations running UNIX. Improvements in both the average response time and the maximum number of operations the object could perform per second were noted. These results supports our belief that what we are doing in *ISIS* will be valuable in a wide range of distributed computing projects in

years to come.

1.2. Fault-tolerant process groups

The crux of our present effort is to develop a system that will support *fault-tolerant process groups*, an idea which we first reported in [4] and elaborate on in [5] (a copy of which is attached). Such a group consists of a set of processes that cooperate to implement some fault-tolerant distributed service. In the case of a resilient object, the group members are the components of the object, and implement a coordinator-cohort algorithm to provide fault-tolerant processing of client requests [1]. However, the process group approach also simplifies a wide range of other problems, ranging from distributed process control software (i.e. to control critical tasks within a power plant or spacecraft) to more conventional distributed computing tasks, such as dynamic reconfiguration of a distributed program. We are making rapid progress on an implementation of this approach, and will soon complete the lowest levels of a new system providing for fault-tolerant inter-site and inter-process communication support based on the algorithms given in our papers. Once this layer has been completed, we expect to have higher levels, which implement the process group abstraction, working very rapidly. Our initial work is being done using UNIX, but we are minimizing our dependence on UNIX-specific features in the expectation that UNIX will eventually be replaced by some new operating system.

1.3. New forms of fault-tolerant objects

A forthcoming paper will report some recent work of ours on mechanisms for supporting fault-tolerant objects that provide predictable behavior in the presense of concurrency and failures, but without the overhead of a transactional access mechanism. Such an object is best viewed as a "shared memory", implemented using message passing in a way that provides predictable behavior and eliminates both the need for higher level synchronization and for special code to handle failures. Since these are common sources of complexity in distributed software, users of these facilities can build fault-tolerant distributed programs without being particularly sophisticated

about distributed computing. On the other hand, since access to the shared memory is not transactional, much higher performance can be achieved than using resilient objects. Moreover, shared memories can be used for interprocess communication in ways that are awkward to express using resilient objects. Thus, the approach promises to provide a cheap, easily used, alternative to resilient objects. We plan to include software support for this approach as a component of the fault-tolerant process group system we are now building.

1.4. Other areas of activity

Research on techniques for applying our work to parallel software and methods for tolerating network partitioning continues. In addition, some of the new graduate students who have joined the project are starting to explore problems in fault-tolerant process control and high level operating systems software based on the fault-tolerant process group approach. We will have more to say about work in all these areas during the next few months.

2. Project Personnel

The *ISIS* project has been successful in attracting some very strong new graduate students, largely because of a distributed computing course that Birman taught during Spring 1986. In fact, the department as a whole has become an extremely active research area, and now includes six faculty members with interests in areas relating to *ISIS*. There have been no changes in the key personnel of the project, which continues to be run by Prof. Birman with the help of Dr. T. Joseph.

3. Travel

Several members of the *ISIS* project attended the Asilomar workshop on fault-tolerant distributed computing in Asilomar, California during March 1986. Prof. Birman presented a paper at this workshop. Afterwards, he visited the IBM San Jose Research Center, Cheriton's V group at Stanford University, and Ferrari's DASH group at Berkeley. Other trips (to the Universities of Rochester and Toronto) did not use project funds. Additionally, graduate student A. El Abbadi

presented a paper on techniques for tolerating network partitioning at the March *Principles of Database Systems* conference in Boston.

4. Budget summary

We conclude with a summary of the financial status of the project, which is close to projections in all categories.

Expenditures - 2/5/86 - 5/4/86

	Planned budget for period	Expenses for period	Prior Expenses	Total to 11/4/85
Secretary support	544	584	484	1028
Summer faculty		-0-	20,609	20,609
Research Associate	8,700	8,700	6,444	15,144
Graduate students	18,633	18,633	77,406	96,039
Employee benefits	2,635	2,635	4,035	6,670
Computer maintenance	769	1,000	4,025	5,025
Publications	327	917	1,457	2,374
Supplies	253	419	3134	3553
Computer Supplies	154	-0-	643	643
Travel	2,000	1,933	11,170	13,103
Programmer		1,006		1,006
Equipment		67,993		67,993
Indirect cost	10,981	11,468	62,578	74,046
Totals	44,996	46,249	260,984	307,233

5. References

- [1] K. Birman. Joseph. ISIS: A system for fault-tolerant distributed computing. Dept. of Computer Science, Technical Report TR-86-744, April 1986.
- [2] T. Joseph and K. Birman. Low-Cost Management of Replicated Data in Fault-Tolerant Distributed Computing Systems. *ACM Trans. on Computing Systems*, Feb. 1986.
- [3] T. Joseph. Low cost management of replicated data. *Ph.D. dissertation*, Dept. of Computer Science, Cornell University, January 1986 (Available as TR-85-712, December 1985).
- [4] K. Birman and T. Joseph. Reliable communication in an unreliable environment. Dept. of Computer Science, Technical Report TR-85-694, (Aug. 1985; Revised Sept. 1985).
- [5] K. Birman and T. Joseph. Communication Support for Fault Tolerant Process Groups. *Proc Asilomar workshop on fault-tolerant distributed computing*, Springer Verlag, March 1986.

Communication Support for Reliable Distributed Computing*

**Kenneth P. Birman
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COMMUNICATION SUPPORT FOR RELIABLE DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING

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ABSTRACT

We describe a collection of communication primitives integrated with a mechanism for handling process failure and recovery. These primitives facilitate the implementation of fault-tolerant process groups, which can be used to provide distributed services in an environment subject to non-malicious crash failures.

1. Introduction

At Cornell, we recently completed a prototype of the *ISIS* system, which transforms abstract type specifications into fault-tolerant distributed implementations, while insulating users from the mechanisms by which fault-tolerance is achieved [Birman-a]. A wide range of reliable communication primitives have been proposed in the literature, and we became convinced that by using such primitives when building the *ISIS* system, complexity could be avoided. Unfortunately, the existing protocols, which range from reliable and atomic broadcast [Chang] [Cristian] [Schneider] to Byzantine agreement [Strong], either do not satisfy the ordering constraints required for many fault-tolerant applications or satisfy a stronger constraint than necessary at too high a cost. In particular, these protocols have not attempted to minimize the latency (delay) incurred before message delivery can occur. In *ISIS*, latency appears to be a major factor that limits performance. Fault-tolerant distributed systems also need a way to detect failures and recoveries consistently, and we found that this could be integrated into the communication layer in a manner that reduces the synchronization burden on higher level algorithms. These observations motivated the development of a new collection of primitives, which we present below

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Our broadcast primitives are designed to respect several sorts of ordering constraints, and have cost and latency that varies depending on the nature of the constraint required [Birman-b] [Joseph-a] [Joseph-b]. Failure and recovery are integrated into the communication subsystem by treating these events as a special sort of broadcast issued on behalf of a process that has failed or recovered. The primitives are presented in the context of *fault tolerant process groups*: groups of processes that cooperate to implement some distributed algorithm or service, and which need to see consistent orderings of system events in order to achieve mutually consistent behavior. Our primitives provide flexible, inexpensive support for process groups of this sort. By using these primitives, the *ISIS* system achieved both high levels of concurrency and suprisingly good performance. Equally important, its structure was made suprisingly simple, making it feasible to reason about the correctness of our algorithms.

In the remainder of this paper we summarize the issues and alternatives that the designer of a distributed system is presented with, focusing on two styles of support for fault-tolerant computing: remote procedure calls coupled with a transactional execution facility, and the fault-tolerant process group mechanism mentioned above. Next, our primitives are described. We conclude by speculating on future directions in which this work might be taken.

2. Goals and assumptions

The difficulty of constructing fault-tolerant distributed software can be traced to a number of interrelated issues. The list that follows is not exhaustive, but attempts to touch on the principal considerations that must be addressed in any such system:

1. *Synchronization.* Distributed systems offer the potential for large amounts of concurrency, and it is usually desirable to operate at as high a level of concurrency as possible. However, when we move from a sequential execution environment to a concurrent one, it becomes necessary to synchronize actions that may conflict in their access to shared data or entail communication with overlapping sets of processes. Additional problems that can arise in this context include deadlock avoidance or detection, livelock avoidance, etc.

2. *Fault detection.* It is usually necessary for a fault-tolerant application to have a consistent picture of which components fail, and in what order. Timeout, the most common mechanism for detecting failure, is unsatisfactory, because there are many situations in which a healthy component can timeout with respect to one component without this being detected by some another. Failure detection under more rigorous requirements requires an agreement protocol that is related to Byzantine agreement [Strong] [Hadzilacos].
3. *Consistency.* When a group of processes cooperate in a distributed system, it is necessary to ensure that the operational processes have consistent views of the state of the group as a whole. For example, if process p believes that some property P holds, and on the basis of this interacts with process q , the state of q should not contradict the fact that p believes P to be true. This problem is closely related to notions of knowledge and consistency in distributed systems [Halpern] [Lamport]. In our context, P will often be the assertion that a broadcast has been received by q , or that q saw some sequence of events occur in the same order as did p .
4. *Serializability.* Many distributed systems are partitioned into data manager processes, which implemented shared variables, and transaction manager processes, which issue series of requests to data managers [Bernstein]. If transaction managers can execute concurrently, it is often desirable to ensure that transactions produce serializable outcomes [Eswaren] [Papadimitrou]. Serializability is increasingly viewed as an important property in "object-oriented" distributed systems that package services as abstract objects with which clients communicate by remote procedure calls (RPC). On the other hand, there are systems for which serializability is either too strong a constraint, or simply inappropriate.

Jointly, these problems render the design of fault-tolerant distributed software daunting. The correctness of any proposed design and of its implementation become serious, not insurmountable, concerns. We face this range of problems in our work on the *ISIS* system, and rapidly became convinced that in the absence of some systematic

never be constructed. In Sec. 6, we will show how the primitives of Sec. 5 provide such an

The failure model that one adopts has considerable impact on the structure of the resulting system. We adopted the model of fail-stop processors [Schneider]: when failures occur, a processor simply stops (crashes), as do all the processes executing on it. We rejected the extremely pessimistic assumptions of the malicious Byzantine failure models because they lead to slower, more redundant software, and because the probability that a system failure will be undetectably malicious seems vanishingly small in practice. Work based on Byzantine assumptions is described in [Lamport] and [Schlichting]. We also assume that the communication network is reliable but subject to unbounded delay. Although network partitioning is an important problem, we do not address it here.

Further assumptions are sometimes made about the availability of synchronized realtime clocks. Here, we adopt the position that although reasonably accurate elapsed-time clocks are normally available, closely synchronized clocks frequently are not. For example, the 60Hz "line" clocks commonly used on current workstations are only accurate to 16ms. On the other hand, 4-8ms inter-site message transit times are common and 1-2ms are reported increasingly often. Thus, it is impossible to synchronize clocks to better than 32-48ms, enough time for a pair of sites to exchange between 4 and 50 messages. Thus, we assume that clock skew is "large" compared to inter-site message latency.

3. Alternatives

Two different approaches to reliable distributed computing have become predominant. The first approach involves the provision of a communication primitive, such as *atomic broadcast*, which can be used as the framework on which higher level algorithms are designed. Such a primitive seeks to deliver messages reliably to some set of destinations, despite the possibility that failures might occur during the execution of the protocol. We term this the *process group* approach, since it lends itself to the organization of cooperating processes into groups, as described in the introduction. Process groups are an extremely flexible abstraction, and have been

employed in the V Kernel [Cheriton] as well in the *ISIS* system. The idea of using process groups to address the problems raised in the previous section seems to be new.

A higher level approach is to provide mechanisms for *transactional* interactions between processes that communicate using remote procedure calls [Birrell]. This has led to work on nested transactions (due to nested RPC's) [Moss], support for transactions at the language level [Liskov], transactions within an operating systems kernel [Spector] [Allchin] [Popek] [Lazowska], and transactional access to higher-level replicated services, such as resilient objects in *ISIS* or relations in database systems. The primitives in a transactional system provide mechanisms for distributing the request that initiates the transaction, accessing data (which may be replicated), performing concurrency control, and implementing commit or abort. Additional mechanisms are normally needed for orphan termination, deadlock detection, etc. The issue then arises of how these mechanisms should themselves be implemented. Our work in *ISIS* leads us to believe that transactions are easily implemented on top of fault-tolerant process groups; lacking such a mechanism a number of complicated protocols are needed and the associated system support can be substantial. Moreover, transactions represent a relatively heavy-weight solution to the problems surveyed in the previous section. We now believe that transactions are inappropriate for casual interactions between processes in typical distributed systems. The remainder of this paper is therefore focused on the process group approach.

4. Existing broadcast primitives

The considerations outlined above motivated us to examine reliable broadcast primitives. Previous work has been reported on this problem, under assumptions comparable with those of Sec. 2, and we begin by surveying this research. In [Schneider], an implementation of a *reliable broadcast* primitive is described. Such a primitive ensures that a designated message will be transmitted from one site to all other operational sites in a system; if a failure occurs but any site has received the message, all will eventually do so. [Chang] and [Cristian] describe implementations for *atomic broadcast*, which is a reliable broadcast with the additional property that messages

are delivered in the same order at all overlapping destinations, and this order preserves the transmission order if messages originate in a single site.

Atomic broadcast is a powerful abstraction, and essentially the same behavior is provided by one of the primitives we discuss in the next section. However, it has several drawbacks which made us hesitant to adopt it as the *only* primitive in the system. Most serious is the latency that is incurred in order to satisfy the delivery ordering property. Without delving into the implementations, which are based on a token scheme in [Chang] and an acknowledgement protocol in [Schneider], we observe that the delaying of certain messages is fundamental to the establishment of a unique global delivery ordering; indeed, it is easy to prove that this must always be the case. In [Chang] a primary goal is to minimize the number of messages sent, and the protocol given performs extremely well in this regard. However, a delay occurs while waiting for tokens to arrive and the delivery latency that results may be high. [Cristian] assumes that clocks are closely synchronized and that message transit times are bounded by well-known constants, and uses this to derive atomic broadcast protocols tolerant of increasingly severe classes of failures. The protocols explicitly delay delivery to achieve the desired global ordering on broadcasts. Hence for poorly synchronized clocks (which are typical of existing workstations), latency would be high in comparison to inter-site message transit times.

Another drawback of the atomic broadcast protocols is that no mechanism is provided for ensuring that all processes observe the same sequence of failures and recoveries, or for ensuring that failures and recoveries are ordered relative to ongoing broadcasts. We decided to look more closely at these issues.

5. Our broadcast primitives

We now describe three broadcast protocols - *GBCAST*, *BCAST*, and *OBCAST* - for transmitting a message reliably from a sender process to some set of destination processes. Details of the protocols and their correctness proofs can be found in [Birman-b]. The protocols ensure "all or nothing" behavior: if any destination receives a message, then unless it fails, all destinations will

receive it.

5.1. The GBCAST primitive

GBCAST (group broadcast) is the most constrained, and costly, of the three primitives. It is used to transmit information about failures and recoveries to members of a process group. A recovering member uses *GBCAST* to inform the operational ones that it has become available. Additionally, when a member fails, the system arranges for a *GBCAST* to be issued to group members on its behalf, informing them of its failure. Arguments to *GBCAST* are a message and a process group identifier, which is translated into a set of destinations as described below (Sec. 5.6).

Our *GBCAST* protocol ensures that if any process receives a broadcast *B* before receiving a *GBCAST* *G*, then all overlapping destinations will receive *B* before *G*. This is true regardless of the type of broadcast involved. Moreover, when a failure occurs, the corresponding *GBCAST* message is delivered after any other broadcasts from the failed process. Each member can therefore maintain a *view* listing the membership of the process group, updating it when a *GBCAST* is received. Although views are not updated simultaneously in real time, all members observe the same sequence of view changes. Since, *GBCAST*'s are ordered relative to all other broadcasts, all members receiving a given broadcast will have the same value of *view* when they receive it.¹ Members of a process group can use this value to pick a strategy for processing an incoming request, or to react to failure or recovery without having to run any special protocol first. Since the *GBCAST* ordering is the same everywhere, their actions will all be consistent. Notice that when all the members of a process group may have failed, *GBCAST* also provides an inexpensive way to determine the last site that failed: process group members simply log each new view that becomes defined on stable storage before using it; a simplified version of the algorithm in [Skeen-

¹A problem arises if a process *p* fails without receiving some message after that message has already been delivered to some other process *q*: *q*'s view when it received the message would show *p* to be operational; hence, *q* will assume that *p* received the message, although *p* is physically incapable of doing so. However, the state of the system is now equivalent to one in which *p* did receive the message, but failed before acting on it. In effect, there exists an interpretation of the actual system state that is consistent with *q*'s as-

a] can then be executed when recovering from failure.

5.2. The BCAST primitive

The *GBCAST* primitive is too costly to be used for general communication between process group members. This motivates the introduction of weaker (less ordered) primitives, which might be used in situations where a total order on broadcast messages is not necessary. Our second primitive, *BCAST*, satisfies such a weaker constraint. Specifically, it is often desired that if two broadcasts are received in some order at a common destination site, they be received in that order at all other common destinations, even if this order was not predetermined. For example, if a process group is being used to maintain a replicated queue and *BCAST* is used to transmit queue operations to all copies, the operations will be done in the same order everywhere, hence the copies of the queue will remain mutually consistent. The primitive *BCAST(msg, label, dests)*, where *msg* is the message and *label* is a string of characters, provides this behavior. Two *BCAST*'s having the same label are delivered in the same order at all common destinations. On the other hand, *BCAST*'s with different labels can be delivered in arbitrary order, and since *BCAST* is not used to propagate information about failures, no flushing mechanism is needed. The relaxed synchronization results in lower latency.

5.3. The OBCAST primitive

Our third primitive, *OBCAST* (ordered broadcast), is weakest in the sense that it involves less distributed synchronization than *GBCAST* or *BCAST*. *OBCAST(msg, dests)* atomically delivers *msg* to each operational *dest*. If an *OBCAST* potentially causally dependent on another, then the former is delivered after the latter at all overlapping destinations. A broadcast B_2 is potentially causally dependent on a broadcast B_1 if both broadcasts originate from the same process, and B_2 is sent after B_1 , or if there exists a chain of message transmissions and receptions or local events by which knowledge could have been transferred from the process that issued B_1 to the process that

sumption.

issued B_2 [Lamport]. For causally independent broadcasts, the deliver ordering is not constrained.

OBCAST is valuable in systems like *ISIS*, where concurrency control algorithms are used to synchronize concurrent computations. In these systems, if two processes communicate concurrently with the same process the messages are almost always independent ones that can be processed in any order: otherwise, concurrency control would have caused one to pause until the other was finished. On the other hand, order is clearly important within a causally linked series of broadcasts, and it is precisely this sort of order that *OBCAST* respects.

5.4. Other broadcast primitives

A weaker broadcast primitive is reliable broadcast, which provides all-or-nothing delivery, but no ordering properties. The formulation of *OBCAST* in [Birman-b] actually includes a mechanism for performing broadcasts of this sort, hence no special primitive is needed for the purpose. Additionally, there may be situations in which *BCAST* protocols that also satisfy an *OBCAST* ordering property would be valuable. Although our *BCAST* primitive could be changed to respect such a rule, when we considered the likely uses of the primitives it seemed that *BCAST* was better left completely orthogonal to *OBCAST*. In situations needing hybrid ordering behavior, the protocols of [Birman-b] could easily be modified to implement *BCAST* in terms of *OBCAST*, and the resulting protocol would behave as desired.

5.5. Synchronous versus asynchronous broadcast abstractions

Many systems employ RPC internally, as a lowest level primitive for interaction between processes. It should be evident that all of our broadcast primitives can be used to implement replicated remote procedure calls [Cooper]: the caller would simply pause until replies have been received from all the participants (observation of a failure constitutes a reply in this case). We term such a use of the primitives *synchronous*, to distinguish it from from an *asynchronous* broadcast in which no replies, or just one reply, suffices.

In our work on *ISIS*, *GBCAST* and *BCAST* are normally invoked synchronously, to implement a remote procedure call by one member of an object on all the members of its process group. However, *OBCAST*, which is the most frequently used overall, is almost never invoked synchronously. Asynchronous *OBCAST*'s are the source of most concurrency in *ISIS*: although the delivery ordering is assured, transmission can be delayed to enable a message to be piggybacked on another, or to schedule IO within the system as a whole. While the system cannot defer an asynchronous broadcast indefinitely, the ability to defer it a little, without delaying some computation by doing so, permits load to be smoothed. Since *OBCAST* respects the delivery orderings on which a computation might depend, and is ordered with respect to failures, the concurrency introduced does not complicate higher level algorithms. Moreover, the protocol itself is extremely cheap.

A problem is introduced by our decision to allow asynchronous broadcasts: the atomic reception property must now be extended to address causally related sequences of asynchronous messages. If a failure were to result in some broadcasts being delivered to all their destinations but others that precede them not being delivered anywhere, inconsistency might result even if the destinations do not overlap. We therefore extend the atomicity property as follows. If process t receives a message m from process s , and s subsequently fails, then unless t fails as well, m' must be delivered to its remaining destinations. This is because the state of t may depend on any message m' received by s before it sent m . The costs of the protocols are not affected by this change.

A second problem arises when the user-level implications of this atomicity rule are considered. In the event of a failure, any suffix of a sequence of asynchronous broadcasts could be lost and the system state would still be internally consistent. A process that is about to take some action that may leave an externally visible side-effect will need a way to pause until it is guaranteed that such broadcasts have actually been delivered. For this purpose, a *flush* primitive is provided. Occasional calls to *flush* do not eliminate the benefit of using *OBCAST* asynchronously. Unless the system has built up a considerable backlog of undelivered broadcast messages,

which should be rare, *flush* will only pause while transmission of the last few broadcasts completes.

5.6. Group addressing protocol

Since group membership can change dynamically, it may be difficult for a process to compute a list of destinations to which a message should be sent, for example, as is needed to perform a *GBCAST*. In [Birman-b] we report on a protocol for ensuring that a given broadcast will be delivered to all members of a process group in the same view. This view is either the view that was operative when the message transmission was initiated, or a view that was defined subsequently. The algorithm is a simple iterative one that costs nothing unless the group membership changes, and permits the caching of possibly inaccurate membership information near processes that might want to communicate with a group. Using the protocol, a flexible message addressing scheme can readily be supported.

5.7. Example

Figure 1 illustrates a pair of computations interacting with a process group while its membership changes dynamically. One client issues a pair of *OBCAST*'s, then uses *BCAST* to perform a third request on the group. A second client interacts only once, using *BCAST*. Note that unless the first client invoked *flush* before issuing the *BCAST*, the *BCAST* might be received before the prior *OBCAST*'s at some sites. Arrows showing reply messages have been omitted to simplify the figure, but it would normally be the case that one or more group members reply to each request.

6. Using the primitives

The reliable communication primitives described above dramatically simplify the solution of the problems cited in Sec. 2:

1. *Synchronization*. Many synchronization problems are subsumed into the primitives themselves. For example, consider the use of *GBCAST* to implement recovery. A recovering process would issue a *GBCAST* to the process group members, requesting that state




Figure 1: Client processes interacting with a process group

information be transferred to it. In addition to sending the current state of the group to the recovering process, group members update the process group view at this time. Subsequent messages to the group will be delivered to the recovered process, with all necessary synchronization being provided by the ordering properties of *GBCAST*. In situations where other forms of synchronization are needed, *BCAST* provides a simple way to ensure that several processes take actions in the same order, and this form of low-level synchronization simplifies a number of higher-level synchronization problems. For example, if *BCAST* is used to request write-locks from lock-manager processes, two write-lock requests on the same item can never deadlock by being granted in different orders by a pair of managers.

2. *Fault detection.* Consistent failure (and recovery) detection are trivial using our primitives: a process simply waits for the appropriate process group view to change. This facilitates the implementation of algorithms in which one process monitors the status of another process. A process that acts on the basis of a process group view change does so with the assurance that other group members will (eventually) observe the same event and will take consistent actions.

3. *Consistency.* We believe that consistency is generally expressible as a set of atomicity and ordering constraints on message delivery, particularly causal ones of the sort provided by *OBCAST*. Our primitives permit a process to specify the communication properties needed to achieve a desired form of consistency. Continued research will be needed to understand precisely how to pick the weakest primitive in a designated situation.
4. *Serializability.* To achieve serializability, one implements a concurrency control algorithm and then forces computations to respect the serialization order that this algorithm chooses. The *BCAST* primitive, as observed above, is a powerful tool for establishing an order between concurrent events. Having established such an order, *OBCAST* can be used to distribute information about the computation and also its termination (commit or abort). Any process that observes the commit or abort of a computation will only be able to interact with data managers that have received messages preceding the commit or abort, hence a highly asynchronous transactional execution results. This problem is discussed in more detail in [Birman-a] [Joseph-a] [Joseph-b].

7. Implementation

The communication primitives can be built in layers, starting with a bare network providing unreliable datagrams. A site-to-site acknowledgement protocol converts this into a sequenced, error-free message abstraction, using timeouts to detect apparent failures. An agreement protocol is then used to order the site-failures and recoveries consistently. If timeouts cause a failure to be detected erroneously, the protocol forces the affected site to undergo recovery.

Built on this is a layer that supports the primitives themselves. *OBCAST* has a very lightweight implementation, based on the idea of flooding the system with copies of a message: Each process buffers copies of any messages needed to ensure the consistency of its view of the system. If message m is delivered to process p , and m is potentially causally dependent on a message m' , then a copy of m' is sent to p as well (duplicates are discarded). A garbage collector deletes superfluous copies after a message has reached all its destinations. By using extensive

piggybacking and a simple scheduling algorithm to control message transmission, the cost of an *OBCAST* is kept low -- often, less than one packet per destination. *BCAST* employs a two-phase protocol based on one suggested to us by Skeen [Skeen-b]. This protocol has higher latency than *OBCAST* because delivery can only occur during the second phase; *BCAST* is thus inherently synchronous. In *ISIS*, however, *BCAST* is used rarely; we believe that this would be the case in other systems as well. *GBCAST* is implemented using a two-phase protocol similar to the one for *BCAST*, but with an additional mechanism that flushes messages from a failed process before delivering the *GBCAST* announcing the failure. Although *GBCAST* is slow, it is used even less often than *BCAST*. Preliminary performance figures appear in [Birman-b].

8. Applications of the approach

Our work with communication primitives has convinced us that the resilient objects provided by the *ISIS* system exist at too high a level for many sorts of distributed application. For example, consider the cognac still shown in figure 2. If independent, non-identical computer systems were used to control distillation, two aspects would have to be addressed. First, it would be necessary to design the hardware itself in a way that admits safe actions in all possible system states. Second, however, one would need to implement the control software in each processor in a way that ensures mutual consistency of the operational computing units. That is, given that the




Figure 2: An automated cognac still

specification describes a sequence of actions to take in some scenario (for example, detection of excessive pressure in the distillation vessel), can we be assured that the operational processors will jointly act to avert a disastrous spill of cognac? We believe that fault-tolerant process groups provide a simple, elegant way to address problems such as this one. We plan to complete an implementation of the protocols by the summer of 1986, and then to develop a collection of software subsystems running on top of them.

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